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Abstract
The need for both usable and secure authentication is more
pronounced than ever before. Due to their ubiquity, recoverability,
and low barrier of entry, passwords remain the most common
means of digital authentication. However, fundamental human
nature dictates that it is exceedingly difficult for people to generate
secure passwords on their own. System-generated random
passwords can be secure but are often unusable, which is why most
passwords are still created by humans. We developed a simple
system for automatically generating mnemonic phrases and
supporting mnemonic images for randomly generated passwords.
We found that study participants remembered their passwords
significantly better using our system than with existing systems. To
combat shoulder surfing – looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as
he or she enters sensitive input such as passwords – we developed
an input masking technique that was demonstrated to minimize the
threat of shoulder surfing attacks while improving the usability of
password entry over existing methods.

Introduction
Although much more secure than user-generated passwords,
random passwords are hard for people to use due to their inherent
disorder. To counteract this fact, we can generate mnemonic
phrases to better remember such passwords. These mnemonics can
be created either by the user or the system. Converting random
passwords into mnemonics can prove quite difficult for users,
suggesting a potential advantage for system-generated mnemonics.
We implemented a system with an iteratively developed wordlist
that invariably generates drastically simpler phrases compared to
previous research. We then added the ability for users to create
pictures to be shown later during recall, as seen in Figure 1. To
avoid relying on security through obscurity, potential attackers are
assumed to have complete knowledge of our system, including the
exact wordlist used and dedicated practice on attacking it.
Since the very act of authentication itself can also be a soft spot for
unauthorized users to attack, we looked to mitigate the threat of
shoulder surfing from observers or hidden cameras. Different
techniques can be employed to hide sensitive input, such as the
common practice of replacing entered text with bullets. Previous
input masking research has focused exclusively on increasing
resistance to shoulder surfing but with a large decrease in usability.

Figure 1. The mnemonic phrase (left) and picture complement each other as simple but effective memory aids.
The decoy text (right) obfuscates the typed password while also acting as a trap for potential attackers.

Method

Results

Our first study utilized a between-subject design to evaluate the usability and security of our mnemonic
generation system. Fifty-four participants were assigned, based on a balanced Latin square, to one of the
following three conditions: no mnemonic, user-created mnemonic following NIST guidelines (Scarfone &
Souppaya, 2009), or our new system. Each participant was assigned three passwords to be recalled later
during the first session as well as in a second session after roughly a week. Participants were instructed
not to write down or rehearse their passwords or mnemonics. To evaluate the security of our system,
twenty-four participants were extensively trained to attack the created accounts in a follow-up study.

Our mnemonic generation system performed very well across the
board. Although account creation time for the system-generated
mnemonic increased, recall time was unaffected. As seen in Figure
2, users were 1.8 times likelier to succeed with our system than
with a user-generated phrase and 2.3 times likelier than with no
phrase. Security with our system was slightly reduced – equivalent
to losing less than three-fourths of a character in password length.

Our second study examined the usability and security of input masking techniques using a within-subject
repeated measures design. The experimental task was to enter 15 sets of random alphanumeric eightcharacter passwords. Fourteen participants were recruited in pairs and took turns as both legitimate
users and shoulder surfers for all five investigated input masking techniques:
Cleartext
Invisible
Bullet
Interval
Decoy (Purloin)
bx3jm8vv
••••••••
•••••••v
bx3jm8vv
nj4vy9hh
Objective variables measured in both studies included account creation time, login time, error rate, and
success. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) and Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990)
measured security. Subjective variables included NASA-TLX workload indices and SUS usability scores.

Purloin performed at the top of both security (see Figure 3) and
usability (see Figure 4). Bullet masking was secure but near the
bottom in usability. Interval masking was near the bottom of both.

For the majority of our dependent variables, we used a one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval
to determine significance. When appropriate, a log transformation was first applied to achieve normality.
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which conditions differed significantly from one
another. Success was analyzed using a binary logistic regression.

Discussion
One of the greatest benefits of our systems is the ease of
transition from existing security practices, as they are simple
enough to require neither training nor special equipment such as
a touchscreen or eye tracker. They work cleanly with the
password systems and policies already in deployment today.
Not a single intrusion attempt against any of our systems was
successful. Even so, the findings suggest that lengthening the
passwords by even one character could increase net security
while remaining much more usable than current systems.
We strongly recommend against the interval masking commonly
seen in mobile devices. In light of threats from the ever-growing
computing power widely available, we seek to expand our work
to integrate both mobile devices and longer passphrases, which
our systems are particularly well positioned to support.

To address this gap, we developed Purloin: an input masking
technique based on the concept of hiding something in plain view,
from Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” By using decoys to
mask legitimate input, we strive to combine the usability advantage
of unmasked text with the security advantage of masked text.
Because the color and position of the genuine password remain
consistent, Purloin users know where to look for feedback and
make fewer errors, while attackers are beset by an assortment of
false passwords. The system defends against camera attacks and
repeated shoulder surfing attacks by locking out intrusion attempts
based on any false passwords and notifying the legitimate user.

Figure 2. Second-session success rate
(larger values indicate increased memorability)
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